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This thesis examines the problems associated with the
abundance of information generated by decision aids, and
utilizes James G. March's model of organizational decision
making as a medium to examine information. The emphasis is
on choice situations resulting in "flight", "oversight",
and "resolution" conditions and how the related provisions
of information load prejudice the above-mentioned conditions.
The foundation and the resultant perspective of this thesis
is predicated upon a survey of over fifty government funded
studies on decision making, tactical decision aids, tactical
information requirements analysis, modeling criteria,
organizational behavior, and the influences they have on
choice outcomes.
The intent of this research is to provide a more realistic
depiction of information usage by simulating the effects of
various levels of information load on the choice process.
This study recognizes information load as a condition which
affects Naval tactical decision processes and hence has
applicability, at least by association, to TDSS (Tactical
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I. INTRODUCTION
Despite the continued attempts and the voluminous
products of years of research in the field of decision
theory and decision methodology, no singular approach has
gained complete acceptance, nor has this research yielded
the ideal model with which Decision Support Systems could
3be built and utilized within the realm of C I (Command,
Control, Communications, Intelligence) without many serious
shortcomings. Inadequate recognition of the problems of
over-information in model selection is one such
shortcoming.
A complete understanding of the tactical decision
maker's decision making processes is imperative in order to
design tools that truly support /aid the decision maker.
Often the tactical decision maker is hampered by too much
information rather than not enough. Thus, as decision aids
2
and tactical decision support systems become more abundant,
13 2
3
C I is used synonymously with C (Command and Control),
C (Command, Control and Communications) and C 4 (Command,
Control, Communications and Computers).
2
A specialized Management Information System designed
to support a decision maker's activities and decision
processes by utilizing computer-based technology, the
emphasis of such a system is to aid personnel faced with




the quantity of information that can be handled effectively
by the decision maker will become as important as what types
of information are provided.
This thesis is an examination of information load and
how it influences the decision process. This concept of




which will be discussed at considerable
length in Chapter IV.
The methodologies commonly used to determine information
requirements in the past, by their very nature, have
endorsed a model of decision theory. One particular theory/
model seems to have been more frequently utilized than
others. That theory, the rational actor, will be referred
to at a later point. For the present, however, the reader
should contemplate several seemingly obvious , but
nonetheless realistic considerations:
a. Simple problems may be solved with simple solutions.
b. Complex problems frequently require complex solutions
c. The majority of Naval decisions are complex and
demand the "proper" and timely allocation of scarce resources
3 Reference to James G. March or the team of Cohen,
March, and Olsen is considered to refer to the same model,
i.e., "The Garbage Can"; and should be viewed as
interchangeable identifiers.

which leads, many times to a condition known as
"satisficing"
.
d. In order to achieve resolution, prior identification
of the need to seek resolution is necessary.
e. Humans by nature are not rational beings.
f. Over-information frequently "clouds" issues and adds
to the complexity of choice opportunities
.
g. The environmental conditions which surround the
choice process must be considered, and mutual coexistence
between the choice process and environment must be assumed.
Its effect may be limited to only perceptual influences
rather than tangible and easily quantifiable entities.
As mentioned previously, the foundation of this thesis
is March's theory of decision making known as the "Garbage
Can". This is not titled as such to imply that decisions
are garbage, nor is it intended to reflect discredit upon
those faced with making complex Naval decisions. Rather,
this title suggests that it is a repository of many
discarded and usually dissimilar items. This thesis
utilizes the "Garbage Can" as a means to examine information
load, and apply the latter concept to the tactical decision
4
A term developed by Nobel laureate Herbert Simon to
denote problem-solution situations where decision makers are
obligated to choose a less than optimal solution; normally a
method where the first alternative solution is chosen that
meets the requirements of the problem satisfactorily, yet not
optimally. The optimal solution is sacrificed.
10

process. Further references to the March model (not adapted
to a military context) will be referred to as the "Garbage
Can" theory, while the military (Naval) adaptation will be
specifically referenced as such.
Before proceeding further, it is necessary to describe
the contents of this thesis and the structure/approach that
will be utilized to tie many seemingly dissimilar ideas
and/or philosophies together to yield a coherent and
acceptable document.
Chapter I, the introduction, outlines the structure of
this thesis and the order that issues are addressed.
Chapter II is an expose' of the present, and the problems
3
currently being experienced within the C I community. The
3
contents of this chapter, although oriented toward C I, have
similar implications to TDSS (Tactical Decision Support
Systems) and operational decision aids in that these
components are information dependent. Further, it provides
the reader with examples of current commentary which concerns
the development of information producing devices/systems.
Chapter III is a review of several subtleties which
effect the selection of decision models. This is not an
all-encompassing account since the number of problems and
models in existence are numerous and highly specialized.
Rather, a limited discourse is presented on the philosophical
assumptions which are associated with the rational actor
model and the Carnegie theorists.
11

The Cohen, March, and Olsen "Garbage Can" model will be
presented in Chapter IV. It will be presented with an
explanation which permits an understanding of the model and
its underlying assumptions yet without presenting it in such
detail that the entire thesis is dominated solely by this
purest form--yet providing the foundation upon which this
thesis and simulation are founded. The concept of load on
choice opportunities is examined for the first time in this
chapter
.
Chapter V is a expansion of load . Here, a more
quantifiable (yet not rigorous mathematical) account will
be presented in support of a more exact definition of what
components comprise total information Clm). The ensuing
discussion on the timing of information load and its
influence on choice situations serve as a basis for
information load simulations.
Chapter VI is the presentation of the "Garbage Can"
theory with modifications. Here the concepts of IT and E„
(developed in Chapter V) are introduced as enhancements to
the "Garbage Can" prior to applying this model to a Naval
organizational environment. The commentary specifically
examines the Combat Information Center/Flag Tactical Plot
as shipboard locations which endorse the "Garbage Can" model.
Other enhancements /modifications to the March model in the
military application include the concepts of telecommunications
dependent participation, volume, gain, and information load.
12

Chapter VII includes the data generated by the simulation
of the "Garbage Can" model under five information loads
(Appendices A, B, and C) . Commentary relevant to this data
accompanies the data.
Chapter VIII will consist of conclusions . Included are
the author's summary opinions regarding the impact of
information load with regard to the choice outcomes




II. AN EXAMINATION OF PRESENT CONDITIONS
The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) sponsored
a series of three colloquiums to discuss the state of
understanding the technology with regard to command and
control. Leaders from both the academic and business
communities participated.
"The main issue that emerged, centered around a single
theme, with variations: there is not adequate
foundation for a theory of command and control and,
hence, no guiding principles for systems design and
evaluation." [Ref. 1]
The problems and issues identified in the colloquiums
confirmed several fundamental conditions and/or considera-
tions . They
"...confimed an earlier perception that command and
control is not a collection of sensors, processors,
displays, and data links. Rather, command and control
was an extension of basic human decision processes..."
[Ref. 2]
3
The fundamental point here is that if C I is an
extension of human processes and past design and development
has been less than completely satisfactory, then further
attention must be given to how the dynamic and unique
decision process of Naval commanders is performed. Joseph
G. Wohl, senior member of IEEE in his paper "Force
Management Decision Requirements for Air Force Tactical
Command Control" stated that...
"...the theory of command and control must start with a
theory of decision making..." [Ref. 3]
14

The introduction of this thesis was intended to indicate
what preliminary perceptual assumptions have been made, and
to introduce the order of topics so that a miscegenation of
disciplines may be envisioned. This chapter's primary goal
is to provide a sense of credibility to assertions proposed
by the author that new viewpoints and considerations must be
3 5
adopted if the aspirations may hold for C I/TDSS are to be
translated into reality. The author recognizes that
revisionistic proposals are frequently met with opposition;
this paper recognizes this and attempts to present conceptual
ideas in a manner which reduces this type of objection. Yet
inadequate research exists within particular areas addressed
in this paper and should be viewed as areas of further
investigation, rather than areas which proposefully avoid
quantitative qualification, and thus fail to merit serious
consideration. Additionally, it is prudent to recall that
not all thematic entities are quantifiable.
The remaining portion of this chapter is dedicated to
establishing an appropriate frame of reference by which to
consider following chapters. Although this chapter may
seem to dwell of the negative rather than positive
attributes of tactical decision support, it is the negative
5 3This symbolic notation indicates the fusion of the C I
and TDSS concepts, where TDSS's serve as an integral portion
of the C^I concept. It may also be interpreted to mean that




which obviously causes the problems. Additionally, it is of
3fundamental importance to properly portray the C I/TDSS
environment, its problems, and the inherent complexity of
the interdependent forces that comprise this area of study.
Moreover, an examination of the inadequacies discussed in
later pages will be better understood if adequate attention
is given now to the findings of past studies—thereby
providing a historical frame of reference.
A study which presents such findings and thus of
considerable relevance, was completed by Manpower Research
and Advisory Services of the Smithsonian Institute in July
of 1977. It yielded a document entitled Operational
Decision Aids: A Programmed Research for Naval Command and
Control Systems [Ref. 4] and was authored by H. Wallace
Sinaiko. Mr. Sinaiko consolidated numerous findings by a
variety of firms under contract with the ONR (Office of
Naval Research) and the ODS (Operational Decision Aids)
program. Mr. Sinaiko' s document stated that the ODA project
consisted of complex objectives without precedence. One
such objective of this project was to bring together
"several desperate but related technologies ... its
emphasis (was) on recent and technological developments
in four areas: computer science, decision analysis,




This was significant in that it indicates early
endorsement of an integrated approach— a modified "web"
analysis. The products of this study was less encouraging
however. The Naval Warfare Research Center (NWRC) of the
Stanford Research Institute under contract with ONR
provided some seredipitous findings.
" 'For example, task force commanders rarely work in
real time; instead they concentrate most of their effort
on advanced planning. This suggests that decision aids
need not emphasize instantaneous response rates. Task
force commanders are deluged with information so that
providing or increasing communications flow is not
indicated. The element which is not handled well by
task force command systems is that of uncertainty.
Furthermore, high-level tactical decision makers are
highly idiosyncratic in their approaches—a fact that is
too often ignored by systems designers, and more often
than not constrains flexibility rather than enhances it.
A great deal of attention will have to be paid to the
process of introducing a new decision aids into existing
Naval systems'." [Ref. 5]
This type of commentary ignores the realities of combat
and fails to envision the needs of the future by discounting
the need for real-time aids. The military technology that
demands real-time responses to be successful in combat
exists--as was demonstrated in 19 82 during both the Falkland
Island and the Lebanon-Israeli conflicts. The military
technology of the 1980 's has enabled parties to wage a
A term developed by Robert Koing which referes to the
multi-faceted examination of a computer/computing environment
which considers societal implications as an interwoven or web





rapid, high-tech, multi-threat engagement where the rapidity
of battle has never before reached such far-reaching
dimensions. To discount this inevitability in the mid- T 70s
as did the NWRC indicates a very myotic and simplistic view
3
of the possible contributions of C I/TDSS and its time
critical dependencies. Further, it suggests the possibility
that a complex problem such as excessive information can be
easily avoided by stating the symptom rather than addressing
the problem. The latter portion of that quotation has great
importance, however, in that idiosyncratic approaches are
addressed, a characteristic which is relevant to the "Garbage
Can" model. A model which considers individuality and yet
aids the decision process in a combat environment is far
more valuable than a model which is restrictive and is
consistently predictable. This view of idiosyncratic
approaches is supported by numerous sources listed in the
bibliography of this thesis. NWRC also observed that:
"...rapid solutions tend to ignore detail and conse-
quently have lower asymtotic values while highly refined
solutions, possessing a great wealth and richness of
structure, (and) require more time to execute."
[Ref. 6]
This has considerable relevance, and will be addressed
at a later point in regard to information load conditions,
and the militarized adaptation of March's "Garbage Can"
theory.

Sinaiko also noted that:
"...decision makers in these systems (TDSS) remain as
central elements and their traditional model of
operating were not drastically changed... in fact, there
seems to be a general reluctance to incorporate
information into tactical decision systems, even in the
face of ever tightening constraints facing these
systems .. .another important observation, and the one that
flies in the face of an earlier point, is that there
appears to be an overabundance of tactical data being
generated. The technology for filtering and processing
is certainly available and understood; but the resistance
to using it is what has not been overcome." [Ref. 7]
One possible explanation for the previously mentioned
resistance to available technology may be due to the poorly
documented, but generally accepted fact that the introduction
of automated elements into organizations causes considerable
turbulance. It is this author's contention that fear is
partially responsible for this resistance--fear that auto-
mation will either replace the decision maker or at least
weaken (lessen power) the decision maker's role in the
organization. This suggests that job status may be viewed
as being threatened by these new operational decision aids.
However, this was not completely supported by the findings
of CACI, Inc., while operating on the ONR/ODA project. The
following is a quotation from a portion of Mr. Sinaiko 's
paper [Ref. 4] in which he commented on the findings of CACI:
"In its review of literature of organizational behavior,
CACI found both inconclusive and ambiguous statements
about how the decision aids affect organizational
structures . This lead to the investigators development
of their own model for determining the most appropriate
organizational structure for a technical, i.e., automated
environment. The model says that the form of the
organization should be cognizant upon its mission, its
staff, and the technology available to the staff." [Ref. 8]
19

A noteworthy omission exists in the CACI model--the
decision maker. A factor which will be given serious
consideration in this paper. Two questions which the reader
should consider in regard to the above quotation and the
role of decision maker and supporting participants follows.
Is the traditional role of the staff in support of the
tactical decision making in need of organizational restruc-
turing and/or are the task functions which are typically
accepted as "proper" in need of revision? The second
question concerns the latter portion of the above quotation
(e.g., technology available to the staff). Statements which
fail to address the decision maker (as above) carry an
implication that the relationship between decision maker,
technology and supporting participants must be clearly
established in a model. Further, omissions of this type
serve as an inaccurate reflection of the organization being
modeled. As well be seen in Chapter IV the relationship of
participants to choices, and choices to problems, is a
complex matrix structure. To only recognize the staff and
not delineate the relationship between the decision maker
and staff was based on some philosophical assumption which
clearly abstracted the most crucial component of the
decision process. TDSS designers must be concerned with
how decision makers and their staffs are changing in regard
to automation as a composite whole. This must be addressed
now to enable data collection on today's younger generations
20

weaned on devices such as video games and home computers.
These younger generations and their perceptual view of
automation may be entirely different than the view held by
present tactical decision makers. This may suggest that
there will be less resistance in future years to tactical
decision makers using highly automated decision aids. Such
possibilities indicate to this author that preliminary
design considerations and information requirements analysis
performed in the 19 80's will impact on the finished product
which will be operational in the neighborhood of the year
2000. Thus, some of this paper should be viewed as a
commentary towards designing systems for the youth of the
19 80's which will be using systems in the 20 00's. Failure
to do so will result in a resistance to automation in the
year 2000, but for fundamentally different reasons.
Reasons that we can avoid if our creativity is not solely
technology driven; but rather, is centered around Mr. Wohl's
previous comment [Ref. 9] that an accurate theory of decision
making (and a corresponding model) is necessary for
effective C 3 I/TDSS.
Returning to previous comments on the fear mechanisms—an
interim "bandage" for present task force commanders with
little or no exposure to automated aids could be applied by
having specialists assigned rather than having the commander's
complete staff retrained; on the other hand, a commander with
extensive experience in the use of ODAs might be best served
21

by putting the aids directly under his control and not to
install an intervening specialist. Regardless of the
approach which is adopted, the structure of participation
is altered and denotes a condition which must be considered
by designers. Poorly understood structures creates
organizational uncertainty, fosters ambiguous accountability
and responsibility relationships, and does not lend itself
to military organizations which demand strict accountability
for important decisions. The topic of access and decision
structures is examined in greater detail in Chapter IV. The
findings of CACI , Inc., after examining four Navy systems
showed that there were a number of consistent themes all of
which had rather serious implications for decision aids which
were in the development process at the time of their
research
.
First, they noted that the most neglected aspect of
introducing automated decision elements was a lack of
training and a failure to develop a strategic implementation
plan. Both of which are fundamental tools for generating
familiarity and minimizing uncertainty. Further, they found
that few resources were available to support these systems.
[Ref. 9] The above conditions support the pre-conditions
to the "Garbage Can" which are addressed in Chapter IV.
22

Another finding by CACI , Inc., which endorses present
organization structure as well as the manner in which
training and experience is obtained, follows:
"
. . .Automatic aids created an environment that centralized
decision making and that the command authority itself,
although it is not necessarily the most efficient
organization model for solving problem." [Ref. 10]
7
Since that time however, the CWC (Composite Warfare Commander)
concept has been adopted in an attempt to decentralize
tactical decision making, and alter the influences of loosely
g
coupled communications and its embilical relationship to the
"Garbage Can".
Considerable organizational complexity is introduced into
organizational structures when systems that create a
centralized environment are used in support of a decentralized
decision methodology (CWC). Examples of complex structures
are provided in Chapter IV.
The points conveyed thus far hopefully provide the reader
with the feeling that there are few absolutes and that the
previous comment that stated that complex problems most likely
7 2
CWC is the organization scheme where C is functionally
distributed and may also consist of physical distribution.
For a more in depth explanation, consult Ref. 10, p. 12.
g
The concept of loosely coupled systems was developed by
Weick. In this view organizations are viewed as being
comprised of stable, and unstable subassemblies; these
subassemblies are connected by large numbers of loose couplings
For additional information and the relevance of Naval
operations, consult bibliography for paper by Weissinger-Baylon
23

have complex solutions is indeed the case when discussing
Tactical Decision Support Systems. Further, it is hoped
that, it is recognized that a need exists--there must be a
continuing process to search for a "better" decision model
that satisfactorily portrays how tactical decision makers
make their decisions.
Of at least equal importance is how these systems have to
operate to be accepted by the user? Human considerations must
be accounted for if a user friendly product is to be developed
A thorough examination of these factors is not within the
realm of this thesis. They are, however, considerations that
the reader should recognize as important influences in model
selection and its accompanying perspective.
The significance of this chapter is simply to present a
cursory view of selected problems (assumptions) surrounding
TDSS , to indicate why finding the appropriate decision model
is so elusive, and to familiarize the reader with commentary
that is an indicator of present conditions. This chapter
is not meant "^o recognize the considerable advances in
computer related technologies and decision making, rather
a chapter that indicates areas of improvements and one which
recognizes that humans really do not understand themselves
as well as they may think. A serious drawback when designing






The point that Joseph G. Wohl made in regard to C I and
a theory of decision making applies to TDSS and the tactical
arena in general. Such a theory should consider the
complexities of information load, as well as account for the
less than optimal decisions (nonrational choices) that are
generated when the choice process is burdened with excessive
information.
Moreover, the contents of this chapter provide an
indication of the type of critical philosophical assumptions
which accompany the design of decision tools (e.g., NWRC)
.
The failure to view the human decision maker as a sensor and
processor with limitations to assimilate information
reemphasizes the criticality of information load as a
condition which must be recognized and dealt with effectively
Using this chapter as a "springboard", the subtle
implications of philosophical assumptions in modeling are
addressed in Chapter III.
25

III. THE PHILOSOPHICAL IMPLICATIONS OF MODEL CHOICE
Prior to presenting the "Garbage Can" in Chapter IV, it
is important to first describe a void this author feels
presently exists, by addressing other models, and by
providing a mini treatise on several modeling criteria.
Through an examination of their associated weaknesses the
value/contributions of the "Garbage Can" is more clearly
understood.
At this point it should be apparent as a result of the
3previous two chapters that the nature of C I is very
involved and does not endorse any totally agreed upon
decision model to serve as a basis for Tactical Decision
Support System design. Present approaches reflect
numerous problems and are related to the failure to adopt
an universally acceptable model. The task of selecting
such a model requires that agreement first be achieved
among the myriad of philosophical views of the tactical
decision process. Limited agreement, however, does exist
in certain areas. Part of the problem, and yet a point
that most will agree on, is the complex nature of tactical
decisions. It is the author's view that whatever perspective
is adopted, it must account for the quantity of information
that the decision maker must "digest".
26

Supporting a particular model requires avowal of a
particular philosophical point of view. The philosophical
approach which is sanctioned is as important, possibly
more important, than simply sanctioning a model. The
implied significance of a model is how it treats the
idosyncratic behavior of humans. This chapter is a
discussion of such philosophical dogma and the non-superficial
influences that such beliefs have on model selection.
The primary question which pervades this chapter, this
thesis, and essentially all of TDSS design and development is
3based on this assumption: The C I/TDSS composite is informa-
tion related. The fundamental philosophical question which
accompanies this assumption follows: Is the human character
capable of assimilating vast quantities of information in a
rational manner and act upon it to yield consistently
rational conclusions? This question and the answer one
obtains requires the previously mentioned endorsement of a
philosophical view of the decision maker. Examination of
mankind's record to make rational choices which ultimately
9 .
result in resolution is m need of improvement. History
has indicated that decision makers frequently are faced with
recurring choice situations which, if not exactly alike,
certainly are "favored" by similar characteristics. This
9
The proper pairing of problem and solution so that the
same problem does not recur.
27

not only applies to the types of decisions TDSS f s are expected
to aid, but also the decisions that have affected the model
selection for TDSS. The recurring choice situations which
are pertinent to TDSS are choice opportunities such as:
How do we engage hostile aircraft, or do we alter the ASW
screen (anti-submarine screen)? or how should the task force
be allocated? This author contends that these are DSS
(Decision Support System) related questions and not MIS
(Management Information System) queries in that they are
unstructured unique choices. Since time variance exists
between choice opportunities, environmental circumstances
can not be replicated exactly, and hence qualify successive
decisions as unique choices. They are unstructured in the
sense that although they are recurring, they rarely endorse
the same assumptions or yield identical outcomes.
It is this author's contention that too frequently a
philosophical perspective has been endorsed that assumes
than since military leaders hold a reputation as disciplined
individuals then they also exercise a high degree of rational
behavior. According to Graham T. Allison:
"...the influence of unrecognized assumptions upon our
thinking .. .the assumptions we make, categories we use,
our angle of vision. .. channel our thinking." [Ref. 11]
He further states that:




This can be coupled with a comment made by Robert Kling and
Walter Scacchi in "The Web of Computing: Computer Technology
as Social Organization" which states:
"Differences in perspectives have tremendous significance
for the sense one makes of the dynamic aspects of computing
developments (DSS selection) in organizations." [Ref. 13]
Additionally, in reference to adopted models and to perspective
compatibility, Kling and Scacchi state that:
"Different models have different conceptual languages."
[Ref. 14]
The significance of the previously mentioned quotations
is that if military decision makers are always rational beings
then they always generate rational choices. Further, it
implies that, if rational they are able to exercise this
rationality in a combat environment. Yet, if this
rationality is assumed, and system performance is inadequate,
then there is strong evidence to suggest that part of past
problems is that military decision makers may not be
completely rational. Moreover, it suggests, even if only by
association, that rational decision making may not be a
realistic expectation, due to the irrational environment
frequently imposed by combat.
The significance of the "Garbage Can" and the influence
of James G. March upon this model is that he does not view
"...decision-making in the economists' terms of rational
choice from known alternative, but in terms than they
(March, Cyert, Simon-Carnegie theorists) feel reflect
more accurately the manager's real limitations."
29

Further, the philosophical assumptions which comprise
Dr. March's frame of reference acknowledge
"... that managers do not have explicit goal systems or
• preference functions; that a most important and neglected
part of the decision-making process is the step to define
a problem. . .that choices are made to satisfy constraints
(and) not to maximize objectives." [Ref. 15]
Additionally, James March's view of decision making as
is endorsed by the "Garbage Can" recognizes "managerial work
as complex where the stimulus is often ambiguous and the
response is essentially one of groping for a solution..."
[Ref. 16] a point addressed by Simon, 1965, and March and
Simon, 19 58.
These are well founded perspectives by renowned
theorists, and although only briefly discussed they serve
as the foundation of many of the assumptions which had to be
made prior to developing the "Garbage Can" model. They
serve as the "conceptual lens" which should be used to view
the philosophical assumptions of this model.
The "Garbage Can" , addresses indirectly the political
environment in that it recognizes fluid participation, energy
and access structures. Consideration of these factors is
essentially acknowledging alliances and factors other than
the immediate choice opportunity, such as altering
positional power relationships.
As will be observed in latter portions of this thesis
a complexity compensation factor known as "load" is present
in the "Garbage Can" simulation. The philosophical
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perspective of this thesis is one which recognizes this load
factor not simply as a measure of complexity, but as a
qualified measure of information dependent complexity. This
is a measure of complexity induced by information quantity
which recognizes that decision makers must sort through the
information to determine what information is applicable
and/or relevant. This need to sort must consider the
human/behavioral realities of highly idiosyncratic processes
which are frequently nonrational, yet very human and have
political/power implications due to the manner in which
staff (supporting participants) must adjust to, compensate
for, the circumstances imposed upon them.
As will be portrayed in the next chapter, the "Garbage
Can" exhibits a substantial bias on the outcomes of choice
situations. Specifically, it endorses a perspective that
most choices do not yield resolution, while providing a
believable and realistic explanation for outcomes other than
resolution. This accounting of less than optimal choices
violates optimal-rational perspectives by conceding that
non-resolution outcomes are more frequent than resolution
outcomes. Certainly, this is a very real and very important
distinction, and one which must be addressed if reality is to
be closely approximated. The theme of optimal-rational
perspectives suggests that given the correct information the
decision maker is going to generate a rational choice. By
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association, a rational choice should then yield resolution.
Achieving resolution may also be by chance and hence not
always an indicator of a previously made rational choice.
According to Simon [Ref. 17]
"...no cut and dried method for handling (a) problem
exists (that) hasn't risen before, or because its
precise nature and structure are elusive..."
suggesting that TDSS serves only as the name applies . Not as
a surrogate decision maker, and hence needs to be modeled in





IV. THE COHEN, MARCH, AND OLSEN MODEL: THE GARBAGE CAN
The "Garbage Can" model is a description of organizational
decision making. Further, it is an examination of the factors
that lead to those decisions/choices. The "Garbage Can"
model was originally conceived as an explanation of how
universities and the decision process inherent to the
universities/bureaucratic environments make choices. There
are three preconditions which are fundamental to the






In regard to problematic preferences, Cohen, March, and
Olsen state:
"It is difficult to impute a set of preferences to the
decision situation that satisfies standard consistency
requirements for theory of choice. The organization
operates on the basis of a variety of inconsistent and
ill-defined preferences. It can be described better as
a loose collection of ideas than a coherent structure.
Preferences are discovered through action as much as
being a basis of action." [Ref. 18]
Their comments on Item B follow:
"Technology is often unclear. Although the organization
managers, to survive and even produce, its (the
organizations) own processes are not understood by its
members. It operates on the basis of simple trial-and-
error procedures, the residue of learning from the
instances of past experience, and pragmatic inventions
of necessity." [Ref. 19]
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The third term, fluid participation, is described thus:
"Participants vary in the amount of time and effort they
devote to different domains; involvement varies from one
time to another. As a result, the boundaries of the
organization are uncertain and changing; the audiences
and decision makers for any particular kind of choice
change capriciously." [Ref. 20]
According to Cohen, March, and Olsen, no single partici-
pant dominates a choice situation in all of the preconditions
Further, they note that the three previous properties have
often been identified in studies of numerous organizations.
Another observation of considerable importance is that
these characteristics (behaviors) are a fundamental part of
any organization; however, it is important to note that they
are not necessarily equivalent trade offs. Further, the
findings of Cohen, March, and Olsen indicate that these
criteria are particularly noticeable in organizations which
operate within a political or hierarchical bureaucracy. It
is appropriate to continue to define the terms which
surround this model; this will be achieved by providing an
additional series of quotations to ensure that there is a
minimum possibility for misunderstanding. The next term of
considerable importance is the definition of the choice
situation (choice opportunity). Here, it is defined as:
"A meeting place for issues and feelings looking for
decision situations in which they may be aired, solutions
looking for issues to which they may be an answer,
participants looking for problems or pleasure." [Ref. 21]
This particular definition has considerable significance.
It implies that choice situations are fundamentally
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ambiguous while also suggesting the manner in which choices,
problems and participants are introduced. Further, it
provides an indication that the outcomes of choices, change
as a function of their inputs and their respective flow rates.
When considered in the context of the three conditions
previously mentioned, the concepts of ambiguity and of deci-
sion relevance come into play. Additionally, the patterns
of available energy become dependent on fluid participation.
This fluid participation as previously stated varies in the
amount of time and effort that participants are able to
devote to different choices. Specifically, those key
individuals with considerable inherent power within the
organization have a wider span of control and thus,
theoretically, have greater opportunity to be involved in
choice situations. This higher level of involvement in the
choice processes suggests that the time available per choice
is less, since a finite quantity of time must be allocated
relative to the number of choice situations pending at a
particular time. If this is allied with unclear technology
,
then the process becomes more complicated and certainly more
ambiguous. The ambiguous nature of complex decision making
and the interrelatedness of problems frequently causes a
Technology in an organizational sense refers to the




crisis, particularly if it concerns the allocation of
scarce resources (i.e., time). If scarce resources by their
very nature have limitations placed upon them then the
organization must determine the criteria of preferences
which will govern their utilization. Unclear technology
results when events cannot be clearly separated so that
traditional doctrine can be applied.
When relevance becomes ambiguous , then the events which
are concerned with choice situations become context
dependent. The terminology which Cohen, March, and Olsen
use to describe the process which incorporates these three
conditions is that of a puzzle or mozaic.
It is this author's contention that this concept of
interrelatedness- is typified by the Kling philosophy of web
analysis. This is brought up at this point not to detract
from the March model, and not to confuse "web" theory and
"Garbage Can" theory. Rather, it is noted so that the
underlying idea in "web" analysis is that the organizational
context must be considered as a woven fabric of numerous
entities. This may be considered as analogous to the mozaic
suggested by March and associates. If this philosophical
point of view of the computer environment is adopted as
vaible and then applied to the "Garbage Can" and the puzzle
analogy, then the conceptual viewpoint of the "Garbage Can"
as a decision model is then enhanced. If the discrete
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entity approach is utilized, in the examination of the
verbal portions of the "Garbage Can" , then the value of
this model is degraded considerably.
Of considerable importance, also, is the mix of various
problems and solutions that enter the "Garbage Can". This
mix is partially dependent on streams/flows from other
choice situations as well as the labels that have been
attached to the various other choice situations. This is
not completely historical in nature, it also depends on
what is being produced at the moment. In the words of
Cohen, March, and Olsen, it depends on the mix of cans
available and on the speed at which these flows are
collected. The concept of input flow rates in the military
environment will be addressed at a later point in this
thesis in Chapter V. This fundamental concept of flow
rates and its relationship to time and quantity of informa-
tion will be examined from the viewpoint of information load.
In extreme conditions--conditions of under-information and
over-information--choice situation effectiveness is degraded.
The choice opportunities that receive these input flows
that yield extreme conditions, in turn, eventually yield
11 12
"flight" and "oversight" results.
A condition where a choice is unsuccessfully associated
with a problem. The problem leaves the choice seeking to be
attached elsewhere. No resolution results, see next page.
12
A choice which is activated when problems are attached
to other choices and there is energy to make a new choice
quickly. Making a choice without proper attention to
existing problems is known as "flight".
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In an interview with Dr. James G. March, at the Hoover
Institute, Stanford University, on February 25, 1983, he
stated that the relationship of problems and solutions was:
"...fundamentally related by the temporal proximity of
those entities..." [Ref. 22]
13
which implies again that time of arrival of streams is of
considerable significance here. Further discussion of this
model will be concerned with these input flows (problems
solutions, energy, and participants) and the resulting
structures
.
Below is a diagram that describes graphically the process












Streams are the primary inputs to the "Garbage Can"
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Entering this "Garbage Can", or receptical, are flows of
problems, solutions, energy, and participants. Out of that
can are three conditions known as resolution, flight, and
oversight (the products of the choice).
Resolution implies a correct matching of problems and
solutions, indicating that further effort (energy) is not
needed to rectify that particular choice situation.
The flight condition, however, implies a fleeing
mechanism—that a resolution condition has not resulted due
to the inability to match problem to solution or match
solution to the problem. This mismatching occurs when high
uncertainty exists--uncertainty as to what exactly the choice
involves. It equates to the idea that one cannot find an
answer until one has formulated the question. According
to Weick [Ref. 23], frequently one cannot find the answer
until one has formulated the question, and thus in
organizational settings people frequently must work in
reverse. We have heard the statement: "I'll believe it when
I see it." However, within the context of this examination,
it is more appropriate to consider this: "I'll see it when I
understand it." This concept of: "I'll see it when I
understand it," has another important underlying theme:
although streams are not dependent on one another, they are
not completely independent of one another either. One
stream does not dictate or depend on the presence of another;
however if a critical stream is not present, resolution will
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not result. This implies that their meeting is largely by-
coincidence, as is the process of "seeing it". Oversight is
obviously neither resolution or flight, which places it is
the "gray" area in between. Here a choice is made, however,
it does not yield a lasting solution as typified by
resolution. The rationale which produces such a choice
may be described by: "I'll make a decision, because making
a decision has to be better than no decision at all".
Additionally, conditional meetings are largely influenced
by access matrices.
As stated in Ambiguity and Choices in Organizations :
"Streams of problems, choice opportunities, solutions
participants are channeled by organizational and social
structure." [Ref. 24]
Included in these structural influences is the time
pattern which portrays the arrival (via streams) of problems,
choices, solutions, or decision makers/decision influencers
(participants), as well as by access and decision arrays.
This is achieved by altering the allocation of energy
(which is allocated by participants); and by the linkages
among the various streams.
Such a structural influence has historical precedent since
past practices in the technology of an organization shape
perceptions and affect the process by which technology is




Organizational structure also provides legitimacy and
the right to participate in choice situations. Although
these rights are not absolutely necessary for actual
involvement in a decision process, they form a biasing
mechanism for those people most likely to be included as
participants. Whether those participants formally designated
to make the decision at hand are qualified frequently
becomes a case in which a participant is designated according
to the organizational structure and is therefore limited in
the attention he/she can provide when a choice opportunity is
presented. Whenever a participant has the time to devote to
the choice, personal power is enhanced, even if it is in
violation of accepted organizational structure. This
elevation of a traditionally lower level decision maker to
a higher level not only alters the established access
structure of the organization, but also creates a methodology
that alters implied relative power structures.
The following is an examination of the structural
(organizational) considerations of the "Garbage Can".
The organizational structure, via its construction,
specifies the rights of participants to gain access to a
choice opportunity. They should be,
"...viewed as invitations to participation." [Ref. 25]
Whether the invitation is accepted or not is dependent
upon the availability of participants and their ability to
direct their talents toward the choice at hand. If the
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participant s ) is/are preoccupied with another task, the
invitation could be rejected. If a void is created, an
individual with available time may participate; this member
may fill a void created by a member who would normally
participate, yet has been obligated to reject the invitation,
This alters traditional, or at least delineated, relative
power schemes.
"...Invitations may be extended either to individuals as
decisionmakers or to problems and solutions as decision
issues." [Ref. 26]
In the former case, when invitations are extended to
problems and solutions, the decision structure is the
emphasis area rather than the access structure. Whereas...
"...The decision structure is a mapping of individuals
on choice opportunities (or classes of choice
opportunities)." [Ref. 27]
If N potential participants and M classes of choices
exist then a N-by-M array is created. This array delineates
the choices available to participants and signifies which
of the participants has a right (claim) to participate.
The number of possible decision structures is great, and
it is not possible to represent all variations without
incurring excessive complexity. However, three principle
participation structures were identified by Cohen, March,




1. Unsegmented participation: This structure allows
any decision maker to participate in any active choice
opportunity. The structure is represented by the array
below in which d.. = 1, if the i participant is eligible

















2. Hierarchial participation: Here the structure creates
a hierarchy so that only important choices are made by
important decision makers, and important decision makers
have invitation to numerous choice opportunities
.
CHOICES

















The hierarchial structure will have considerable impor-
tance in further analogies to the military in that it most
accurately depicts the structure in use by military
organization. For example, an Admiral may (is eligible to)
act as an important decision maker; an Ensign on the other
hand is severely limited in decision making power, relative
to the Admiral, as depicted by the hierarchial matrix. The
first row depicts the invitations available to an Admiral.
The last row those available to the Ensign.
3. Specialized participation: In this structure
decision makers are limited to choices within their
speciality, as denoted by the single 1 at the intersection
of a unique decision maker/choice pairing.
CHOICES
(most important—least important)
10000000000 P Note: all
01000000000 A participatns in
00100000000 R this matrix are
00010000000 T of equal








In actual decision structures, a more complicated array
would be required.
Acting simultaneously is one of three corresponding
access structures. These structures are named similarly:
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unsegmented , hierarchical and specialized. The function
and/or meaning assigned an access structure is different
than a decision matrix. Here, the rules that specify the
rights of access of problems and solutions to choice
opportunities are portrayed. They are represented as
follows
:
1. Unsegmented access: This structure is represented
by a similar N-by-M matrix, however, the dimensions are
10-by-20 vice lQ-by-10 , thus agreeing with the simulation
(Appendix A) . It should also be interpreted to mean that
more problems exist than solutions. The 10-by-20 matrix
allows two problems to enter per time periods of simulation
To reflect this unique modeling assumption the following
three access structures are displayed in a manner which is
in agreement with the simulation. This matrix delineates
the access structure or rules that specify the rights of
access of problems and solutions to choice opportunities
.
Here any active problem (or solution) has access to any
active choice opportunity; that is, a. . = 1 if the i
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2. Hierarchial access: In this structure both choices
and problems (or solutions) are arranged so that important
problems (solutions have access to many choices, and






























3. Specialized access: As before, the specialized
matrix format yields unique pairing. This time, however,
each problem (or solution) has access to only one choice



























In actual organizations, access rules are quite complex
and reflect an altered (more complex) access structure. At
this point, the above structures are presented to emphasize
that organizations range from unsegmented to highly segmented
constructs
.
An example of a more complex access structure in a
military organization might be to reflect geographical
constraints placed upon the organizational structure. In
the United States Navy various fleets are designed/assigned
to specific geographical regions. Thus, decisions concerning
the operation of Naval forces within such regions are the
responsibility of the respective fleet commander. The
associated access structures would reflect this jurisdiction
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criteria. In particular regions as they become focal points
of high geo-political value (Indian Ocean-Iranian hostage
crisis) units from different fleets may be assigned to that
region. Under such circumstances the organizational
structure of the Navy is altered to reflect this condition.
This may occur in one of several methods available. The
important matter is that unity of command result. Failure
to do so results in overlapping areas of jurisdiction, and
hence overlapping access structures on one extreme. The
other extreme being a situation where a void is created
because one fleet assumes the other fleet is "handling"
particular issues. Either case creates the need for
elaborate access structures to ensure that problems reach
those eligible to make choices . The access structures
which are clearly defined support the concept of unity of
command, which in turn enables better coordination between
units and allows effective maneuver in pursuit of an agreed
upon objective. If critical problems are not capable of
being assigned to the correct choices in a timely manner,
and hence not acted upon, then one could expect the most
severe consequences
.
Integrated decisions of a tactical nature demand that
access structures provide/enable necessary problems to
reach not only to the correct location, but do so at the
correct time. Having a problem become assigned to a choice
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after the fact in a rapid multi-threat military engagement
could result in a considerable loss of lives.
Access structures may be further delineated. Decisions
may fall into several categories. Both the planning and
execution of plans demand that choices be made within these
areas. The significance of such phases is that two different
access structures result. Certain access strucutres may
concern the planning phase and its problems and choices
,
while another access structure may concern the execution
phase and its problems and choices . Ambiguity and unclear
technology affect these structures , and particularly the
relationship between the two structures.
In unclear technology results in the hinderance of problem
m
arrival, choice arrival, or participation then redundant
and conflicting information can be expected in an attempt
to seek clarification. The generation of excess information
places additional duties upon the decision makers and their
supporting staffs . The effort expended to sort and integrate
excess information depletes available energy, which in turn
affects choice outcomes. As will be indicated in Chapter V,
excess information becomes intermeshed with the total
stream of information entering a choice--a condition which
can be minimized if access structures are clearly and
accurately formulated.
14
Arrival refers to the time a stream enters a choice.
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V. INFORMATION: ITS NATURE, UTILIZATION
AND IMPACT IN LOAD CONDITIONS
A. THE QUALITIES OF INFORMATION: WHAT IS IT?
Before embarking on a discussion of how information
affects the decision or choice process, it is appropriate
to first define it. According to The American Hertiage
Dictionary of the English Language , information is defined
as follows
:
"1) The act of informing or the condition of being
informed; communication of knowledge; 2) Knowledge
derived from study, experience, or instruction;
3) Knowledge of a specific event or situation;
4) A service or facility for supplying facts or
news . . . 6 ) A non-accidental signal used as an input
to a computer or communications system; 7) A numerical
measure of the uncertainty of an experimental outcome."
A dictionary definition does not provide the degree of
precision needed in this work. It does provide a general
"feeling" that it is a medium which conveys data which has
meaning, purpose and/or value. Its meaning, however, may
not be applicable to the situation to which it is applied
and still retain value via-a-vis some other circumstance.
The worth of information is predicated on whether it is
capable of providing insight, regardless of whether that
insight is positive or negative.
In regard to decision theory, specifically the "Garbage
Can", some medium, a carrier wave of sorts, must transport
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problems and solutions to the choice domain. It is this
author's hypothesis that information is that medium. The
following is the author's view of I (total information) and
its integral components.
Information need not be solely restricted to a transport
function. Rather, it may be instructive (informative) in
nature. This is a function of time, in the sense that
although it may simply endorse a condition, fact, or state
of nature, it has the potential to serve as a problem or
solution at some point in the future. In fact, its arrival
should not be solely futuristically oriented. If it had
preceded the present, it merely should be considered in the
domain of another choice situation.
Graphically:




h cr STATE^ LUTION
TIME





Examples: The helicopter is almost out of fuel: Problem 1
It is raining: State of
Nature
USS Neversail has an aviation refuel
capability: Solution 1
Meaning can be transported with the potential to
influence a choice and as a result has potential value. Thus
it should be considered as component of information. Whether
it is categorized as a problem, solution, or state--it is a
function of the context in which it applies (i.e., "it is
raining" is neither a problem or solution .. .unless it
hinders or resolves another state or event).
If rain prevents one from sunbathing , it could rightfully
be interpreted as a problem. If one's garden is dying due to
lack of rain, then notification of rain may not only indicate
a new state, but also a solution to the previous condition.
The following discourse, although very simplistic is an
examination of information. It reflects this author's
opinions and is an attempt to better define what comprises
information. It is a difficult task in that various academic
groups have avoided definition on the grounds that it will not
be intellectually acceptable, while industry defines informa-
tion to satisfy specific special interest and groups.
Failure to place boundaries, even if to a limited degree,
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discounts the value of a significant component of computeri-
zation. For the purposes of this thesis using set notation,
the following applies:








where : I = Information
P = Problem
S = Solution
K = State of Nature (Condition)
n = nonrelevant
r = relevant
Further, IT may have subscripts of r or n, where r =
relevant and n = nonrelevant. The use of the subscript n
above is only for illustrative purposes and to indicate the
locations of a secondary subscript. The subscript n or r
is an indicator of relevance. I_ may consist of the empty
15
set, or a mixture of P, S, and K; as well as a mixture
of relevant or nonrelevant qualifiers.




tion where I_ has meaning, but no value; it carries the
subscript n to reflect no relevance to the present and hence
no value to the present choice.
or
Irp = (I_ , I ) where relevance is determined on a time
r r r
15 Combinations vice permutations, as well as varying




continuum and time zero equates to the present time quantum,
minus values to some time quantum prior to the present, and
positive values to some point in the future. The previous
equation rewritten to include numeric relevance indicators
to indicate the present state is of the form:
T = (T I )
If the choice situation has passed (and resolution has
occurred) , and information arrives after that choice then
the information is not applicable to the present and is
irrelevant. If the choice situation has occurred and
resulted in "flight" or "oversight", it has created a choice
pending a condition in which a negative subscript may indeed
be relevant, in that a choice still exists requiring resolu-
tion. If the subscript is positive, it denotes irrelevant
information unless the information addresses future plans.
This is a relative measure which should be viewed in terms
of minutes in the tactical environment and in terms of one
time period in the simulation. It (the relevance indicator)




= Total Participation = (P or P
T






= Total Energy = (P T)
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where PM = Participation (member)
P_ = Participation (Individual)
T = Time available (non-subscript)
T(subscript) = total
Choice = (Im, Em) where Im = Total Information and
Em = Total Energy
That is, choice is some set of information consisting of
problems, solutions, states of nature, and total energy and
where the total energy applied is comprised of some set of
total participation and time. P is the number of member
entities (organizational entities, e.g. ships) or number of
participants (individuals); and P is the measure of
individual participation expended in a particular choice.
The summation of members denotes the total number of
participants which were involved in a particular choice.
Most likely these participants contributed various amounts
of energy to the choice in question. Thus, the total energy
applied to a choice is equal to the summation of all
individual energy contributions. If all members contributed
equal energy then the product of the number of members and





P is included for two primary reasons:
1. As P„ increases, a diffusion of responsibility occurs,
1 R
thus suggesting a propensity to increase risk.
2. To serve as an indicator of fluid participation.
P_ serves multiple purposes as well:
1. A measure of individual contribution under conditions
of unequal contributions (i.e., a combination of both
important and less important members).
2. A relative measure of individual power within the
organization
.
3. A measure of effort/attention available to expend on
one choice (degree of preoccupation with other choices).
Information relevance aids or hinders the "ambiguity of
relevance" concept previously mentioned in Chapter IV.
Although it was stated that I„ =0 was relevant, it should
L
N
be recalled that contextual criteria on information was also
established as a precondition. Since the possibility of
several choice situations occurring simultaneously is a
very real condition, further quantification other than time
on the choice situation must exist within the decision maker's
cognitive realm. A new subscript must be considered. But
first assume that:
1 fi
For additional information on this assumption, consult
papers by Pruitt (1971) in the risk supplement to the Journal
of Personality and Social Psychology.
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I„ = Total Information = (I n , I„, I,,)
1 r o Is.
and relevance is assigned according to:
Total Relevance Information = I™ = (I_. , I , l v )1 r o ix


























and the availability of inputs. Note also that by-
substituting the r with an n we have an expression of total
nonrelevant information.
Additionally, it is important, at this point, to discern
between data and information. For the purposes of this
discussion, data is considered as a collection of elements
of information not yet processed to provide immediate
meaning. It should be viewed as having potential value or
potential meaning—but until processed into a coherent form
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(i.e., video, voice, formatted telemetry) it should be viewed
only as a state or condition. This conditional status may
be altered via processing to provide information representing
a problem, solution, or state. The rules of relevance apply
to data as previously stated.
The third subscript indicates to which realm of choice
information is to be applied. It is expressed as a numeric
character, such that (e.g., I.
,
= I p ) it indicates
r
i °i
relevant problem information for choice 1, thus enabling
simultaneous information inputs for choices within the same
system to be assigned properly.
Below is an illustration which is a physical representation
of the "Garbage Can" (choice opportunity) scenario modified











Here, the initial choice as depicted in Chapter IV has
been altered to reflect I- and E„ as inputs and the three
possible outcomes of a choice. The implication being that
both choices two and three contain information carried by
their respective "oversight" and "flight" inputs and await
additional information and energy to alter their inputs
into resolution. Insufficient information, or excessive
information, will effect the degree of ambiguity and alter
the requisite amount of total energy required to generate
resolution. If the above is viewed as a system with
geographic (physical) separation and each "Garbage Can"
represents a realm of choice, then consider the affect of
not providing the participation needed for resolution in
choices two and three. They would be destined to remain as
the starting points in a changing of "oversight" and "flight"
outcomes. To collect the energy to prevent this chain
reaction scenario from occurring is dependent upon informing
members of the need to participate.
The failure to include all participants , failure to
include a participant, failure to supply accurate information
to a participant, the inability to communicate information
needed to a participant in a choice situation, or to provide
it after a choice, are examples of degraded loosely-coupled
communications. The aforementioned are essentially cases of
incorrect choice classification. Where failure to input can
be considered as the empty set for that type of information
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input, or as is the failure to communicate a choice. Failure
to communicate simply inputs the empty set into the choice
situation of another decision maker's domain and falsely
biases his choice situation, which affects joint coordination
efforts and increases perceived risk and uncertainty. These
conditions are represented by the third subscript. Failure
to provide/receive accurate information results in dis-
functional system performance. An input of type I may be
required to enable decision maker "x" to be aware of the
conditions which surround his/her particular choice while
enabling coordination with decision maker M y" . The passing
of I„ should be thought of as a type of overhead that is
required if coordination between members is to be preserved.
Excessive I complicates the sorting and relevance
determination task of a decision maker by increasing
ambiguity
.
For example, choice 1 could concern as ASW (Anti-
submarine Warfare) choice, while choice 2 was concerned
with an AAW (Anti-war Warfare) choice--both within the same
system (task force), both receiving the same information
17(NTDS)
, both on the same time reference, but distinct




choices nonetheless. This is consistent with the CWC
18(Composite Warfare Commander) concept
An examination of processes within the "Can" follows.
B. THE TEMPORAL PROXIMITY OF PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS
The following theoretical suppositions are designed to
provide an illustrative mechanism to describe how problems
and solutions align according to the timely application of
energy. This explanation is this author's and should not
be considered as part of the "Garbage Can". It was
conveniently influenced by notions from other disciplines
reflecting a natural order, as well as entropic characteris-
tics. Suppose, momentarily, that the streams of problems,
solutions, energy and participants could be described
utilizing many of the laws from other disciplines.
The following is such a set of suppositions and/or
hypotheses. They are metaphorically related to laws from
other fields of endeavor and seek to provide a sense of
order to the manner in which problems , solutions , and states
of nature position themselves in relationship to one another
18
Distinct AAW and ASW choice are consistent with CWC
concept only to the extent that they most likely are made by
separate individuals. If a conflict occurs higher authority
must negate either choice, then a third distinct choice
occurs (whether to negate or not) due to the entry of a new
problem (the conflict). For additional information on the




within the choice. These suppositions are in no way a
reiteration of the Cohen, March, and Olsen model, nor are
they intended to refute or weaken their model. Rather,
they should simply be viewed as this author's opinions.
It is a conscious attempt to expand on a comment made by
Dr. James G. March, at the Hoover Institute, Stanford
University, on February 25, 1983. He stated that...
"...problems and solutions are related in some way . . .
I
think they align according to their temporal proximities."
It is this author's view that this temporal relationship
is a function of the time of arrival of streams and the
intensity and the timing of the energy which is applied to
the entities which enter the choice.
The following is an illustration to describe this implied
order, while addressing the concept of perceptual cognition.








Figure 5.3 SORTING BY ENERGY LEVELS
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If the above may be examined metaphorically as a
non-conservative force field (atom field management),
consider the following as an illustrative extension of that
concept /mechanism.
Suppose that the outermost ring denotes a boundary. The
19inner field equates to a region of perceptual cognition and
the outer field denotes a region which is not considered
within the realm of a choice situation. Using this concept,
inject relevant information types into the inner field and
nonrelevant to the region beyond cognitive perception
(outside boundary) to provide a method of primitive pre-
liminary sorting. This boundary is established not by what
should be included as relevant, but by what the decision
maker is capable of assimilating. Inclusion is predicated
upon the individual's perceptions, personality, risk taking
philosophy, view of uncertainty, reaction to ambiguity, and
success/failure reaction mechanisms.
Expanding this schema, let us suppose that streams
(March model: problems, solutions, energy, participants)
enter this creation with a great deal of disorder. This
sorting process is then applied in accordance with the
19 Cognition is used here to describe the process or
processes by which a person acquires knowledge. Perceptual
cognition implies ones perception of events, recognizes the
need to, or the capability of, acquiring that knowledge.
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decision maker's predisposition and energy. Recall that
problems and solutions may be viewed as components of I™.
This predisposition would account for why something which
is not a problem might get assigned as one. A decision
maker who is looking for a problem, whether or not one
actually exists, will frequently assign it to a premade
solution.
The boundary is simply defined in terms of individual
perceptive attitudes and not as a physical constraint. The
random nature of these components are free to transverse
the boundary conceptually, yet are acted on only if
recognized. The recognition process, once again, is
achieved only if applicable to the choice presently in
20progress, and thus classified as perceptually relevant.
The rate at which problems and solutions enter the realm
of relevance is a function of the rate with which they
enter the choice situation.
Additionally, if this is assumed, then it is possible
to associate this potential increase of information with an
increase in entropy of the choice scenario. In an attempt
to control, or bring order to, this chaotic state the
20
Relevance in this section is a function of an
individual's perception, as opposed to time dependent
relevance discussed in the previous section.
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perceptual cognition boundary may recede; or it may remain
as positioned initially and greater energy may be applied
and hence greater participation may be required instead.
Recall the relationship between energy and participation
and time, e.g., E~ = (P™, T).
Increased energy expenditure essentially creates a field
with distinct energy levels. This field and the associated
energy levels provide an "order" depicted by orbitals with
which the positioning of problems and solutions is effected.
Assuming that fewer solutions than problems exist, it is
appropriate to have the solution of a particular choice
situation serve as the nucleus and have the problems serve
as the orbiting bodies. The more energy which is applied to
a problem "kicks" that problem into a higher energy level
(an interior movement). If a problem receives little
attention, or is not recognized as a problem then it has
insufficient energy to maintain its orbit. Hence, instead
of gravitating inward to a solution, it escapes into the
outer field only to be attracted to another choice situation
with available energy to attract it into its domain of
influence. If a problem "escapes" then "flight" has occurred
and essentially the problem will not be resolved until it




If on the other hand excessive energy is applied to a
problem orbiting (in relative proximity to a solution) it
may be temporarily mated to a solution in the nucleus. This
condition of an unstable pairing of problem to solution will
remain only as long as the requisite energy for bonding
remains. A choice/decision has been made whenever bonding/
pairing is accomplished. Should the energy level begin to
decrease when participant energy is redirected then the orbi-
tal will expand until an outer field status is achieved.
Moreover, this pairing is only temporary in nature, and
although a pairing has occurred it represents the misallo-
cation of participant energy. The energy expended to achieve
this match allowed other problems to disassociate themselves
with this choice situation and to drift from their orbitals
enabling classification as "flight" problems. The tempo-
rarily bonded problem and solution eventually lack the
necessary energy (attraction) to remain bonded in their
unstable condition and thus separate. This temporary remedy,
applying excessive energy to the "wrong" problem and solution
match, served only as a temporary fix not yielding resolution
and accommodated an "oversight" condition, upon separation.
The optimal and desired condition is "resolution", in
which energy is "properly" applied to a problem enabling it
to gravitate toward a solution, thus facilitating a stable




Further, in this metaphoric scenario it can be assumed
that several problems may attach themselves to a single





Figure 5.4 ALIGNMENT OF PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS
In the above diagram, the solid bar indicates a stable
bonding between problems 1 and 3 and solution A; the sawtooth
indicates an unstable bonding condition between problem 2 and
Solution A. If problem 1 was an ASW threat to the South, and
problem 2 was an enemy surface threat to the South, and
solution A was a maneuver to the North to remain out of
Southern force's conbat radius while refueling and rearming
aircraft, then conscience resolution could be considered
achieved for problems 1 and 2. However, if by maneuvering
to the North the task force entered the combat radius of
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land-based patrol aircraft, an overall "satisfying" condition
is created in which only two of the three problems could be
resolved (considered as partial resolution). The solution
A
—
problem 3 match is unstable with pending "oversight"
potential (i.e., risk of detection exists).
The significance of the above "satisfying" scenario is
that this reflects a common dilemma encountered in combat.
The importance of this concept is that the number of
different types of solutions is less than the number of
different types of problems.
This is largely due to the decision maker's limited
ability to incorporate solutions which may contrary to
personal perceptions which are firmly entrenched within
his personality; eg. you see only what you want to see.
One solution is frequently assigned to different
problems regardless of its correctness, if conditions of
rigidity or high ambiguity exist.
C. INFORMATION AND ITS RELATIONSHIP TO RISK, SEARCH,
TIME AND AMBIGUITY
In the early portions of this chapter, information was
defined and a conceptual ordering of problems and solutions
was provided in an effort to explain the manner in which
problems and solutions are associated—a process which




The following is an examination of the human element in
the decision process. Topics to be discussed include risk
and ambiguity, in relationship to information load conditions.
This is of considerable importance due to the effect these
subjects have on the establishment of cognitive perception
boundaries and the decision maker's success or failure in
digesting or sorting various quantities of information while
operating in a time constrained environment. The critical
variable in the forthcoming discussion is time.
Risk: According to Siegfired Streufert and Glenda Nogami
[Ref. 28] risk increases with a length of time spent on a
task. This raises the question whether decision makers are
aware of their increasing riskiness . This and other commentary
based on Siegfried Streufert and his variuos other research
associates is based on a game /experiment known as TNG
(Tactical Negotiations Game). Here, Siegfried Streufert, in
a series of technical reports generated under contract with
the Office of Naval Research, compiled data and examined
trends of behavior related to the decisions of the decision
makers. The game required players to make political, military,
and economic decision with various types of information,
various qualities of information, i.e., various information
loads (Im)
.
Reference 29 noted that as participants of this game
became more adept and more familiar with their environment,
risk taking increased over time. This was accompanied by an
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increased perception of risk by the subjects in regard to
their decisions. It was also noted in [Ref. 30] that
subjects were able to differentiate, but in only two
dimensions
.
"Once success levels or failure levels became very high,
however, they dropped their risk taking behavior in one
of these dimensional areas and concentrated on the other.
In other words, subjects (or groups of subjects) seemed
to be quite able to differentiate between dimensions
(military and economic) of a task setting and they
utilized a differentiative process in risky decision
making when the task requires." [Ref. 31]
Another related concept is the idea of "risky shift" and the
1961 discoveries of Stoner. Stoner addresses the propensity
to take greater risk in a group setting where a possible
diffusion of responsibility is present. This is mentioned
so that it may be considered when various structures are
discussed in regard to load conditions. Should the reader
desire to examine this area further research by Prewitt or
Stoner should be consulted.
In 196 8 Streufert and Streufert demonstrated that shifts
in risk occur with the amount of information available to
decision makers. Additionally, Streufert and Streufert noted
that subjects which were making either military or economic
decisions made higher risk decisions as either success or
failure increased, and found that groups made higher risk
decisions. In the next diagram, S. Streufert illustrates the
decision makers propensity to take risks versus his/her












Figure 5.5 RISK vs. SUCCESS AND FAILURE
Other research conducted by Streufert and Streufert in
their laboratory indicates that similar dimensional
differentiation is an effect of time. [Ref. 32]
The presence of increased risk, under conditions of
increased success or failure, was reexamined in reference 33
Here, complexity theory was tested as proposed by Driver,
Streufert and Schroeder. The theory postulates an inverted
U-shaped function which relates environmental complexity
(information load, success, failure) to complex perceptions
and behavior. In general, the theory has been supported,
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and of primary consideration was found to hold for
21information load (technical report numbers 2, 18, 20)
when complex decision making was measured, or when complex
perceptions were measured. Risk as predicted increased
under conditions of increasing failure (technical reports
22
numbers 10, 11, 12, 20) . The U-shaped function did not
provide as accurate a prediction of risk with increased
success. The following quote from Reference 3M- is in regard
to the data generated by the previously mentioned studies.
"Data appears to suggest that the failure and success
components of what complexity theorists call 'environ-
mental complexity' may be reducible to load (with
failure increasing, with success decreasing) information
load level."
Additional studies by Streufert and associates concluded
that. .
.
"...information transmission among groups varied in part
with information load..." [Ref. 35]
Although only a cursory discussion of the research
surrounding risk and information load, the research of
Siegfried Streufert and associates has considerable relevance
to the forthcoming simulation results.
9
1
Reports 2, 18, and 2 are additional research papers
by S. Streufert and C. H. Castore between 1967 and 1969.
22 Denotes other technical reports by Siegfried Streufert
and associates, should the reader desire to investigate this
topic further. This author consulted only technical reports
4, 11, and 47.
73

Load and deadlines: When Siegfried Streufert and Susan
Streufert [Ref. 36] examined the effects of information load
(low, medium, high) and time urgency (absent, moderate, high)
they utilized three measures of information search/ informa-
tion activity. The measures were:
1. The number of information search decisions generated.
2
.
The number of integrations based on previous
information search.
3. The number of respondent actions generated that were
information search related
They concluded the following points which were distributed
in Reference 37. This author has reformatted the following
into a listing for brevity.
"1. Previously reported data showing that intermediate
load levels result in optimal integrative performance
were corroborated.
2. Increases in time emergency resulted in decreases in
search activity in general, and in integrative utiliza-
tion of information obtained through search in
particular
.
3. High levels of time urgency in association with high
load levels resulted in fewer search decisions in
complete absence of integrative utilization, but produced
an increase in the respondent actions.
4. The data suggests that a optimal environment for high
level decision makers with planning responsibility should
contain optimal intermediate load levels, but should be
kept relatively free of time urgency."
The decrease in search/sorting activity may be analogous
to the author's suggestion of a narrowing cognitive perception
in an attempt to narrow the scope of choice situation. One
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can certainly understand why search activity decreases when
time is at a premium. If this behavior is applicable to
the combat scenario, then it is certainly understandable why
"flight" and "oversight" should exceed "resolution" when
inadequate time is allowed to search properly.
In reference to item three C. F. Jaques (1978) stated
that respondent actions are quite useful in emergencies, yet
they tend to reflect lower level managerial decisions and
are not adequate when the situation demands high level
decision making. He further stated that respondent actions
are utilized frequently. A similar concept was mentioned by
James G. March (interview of February 25, 19 83) and suggests
to this author that upper level decision makers tend to
become preoccupied with decisions which should be dealt with
by subordinates. One possible explanation, if one refers to
the "Garbage Can" model, is that inadequate energy exists to
solve the "big" problems, so small low level problems are
acted upon instead. If, however, upper level managers left
those decisions to subordinates then possibly the requisite
upper level energy would exist and could be applied selectively
to a few major choices. It seems to be an exercise in
allocating a scarce resource: energy (attention).
Related to the previous commentary on information search
and information load (IT ) is another important concept--
ambiguity. Here, the quality and quantity of information is
examined, but from a different viewpoint. What is ambiguous
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to one person may not be the case with another individual.
Nonetheless, if the information is impartial or ambiguous
and the decision maker receiving the information has a low
tolerance for ambiguity, then a lengthened search process
should be expected, thus accentuating the information
assimilation process. Poor quality information or large
quantities of information enhance the ambiguity of the
information provided.
Pertinent points extracted from Reference 38, an annotated
bibliography on ambiguity, provided the following quotations;
although limited in scope, they have considerable value to
the pending examination of various load patterns. The
following quotes are from that source:
"1. Those individuals who were tolerant of ambiguity
tended to select unstructured fields .. .while those less
tolerant of ambiguity tended to chose relatively
structured fields.
2. Those individuals who thought of themselves as
conventional were more intolerant of ambiguity than
those who were unconventional.
3. Intolerance of ambiguity was positively associated
with authoritarianism."
The concept of I™ (total information) as a medium which
includes information concerning problems, solutions and
states is closely related to the concept of ambiguity.
The importance of viewing the entry of problems, solutions
and states as a single entity (IT ) is essential to the
understanding of information load conditions. First, and of
primary importance, is that problems, solutions, and states
76

rarely enter a choice as discrete streams in "real world"
choice situations. Secondly, if one does assume they enter
as discrete and clearly defined entities then the complex
and time demanding task of sorting problems from solutions,
solutions from problems, symtoms from problems, and the
manifestation of solutions from true solutions is ignored.
Proven/successful decision makers are those individuals
who have the unique talent of getting to the "root of the
problem". These individuals are able to digest the infor-
mation presented to them and quickly determine what is
relevant and what is not; and are able to assimilate seemingly
disjointed ideas/problems/solutions/concepts and produce
integrated decisions which yield resolution. This process can
be improved upon if the information load (I™) is maintained at
a level commensurate with the level of expertise of the
decision maker.
As was stated in Reference 39, the Admirals interviewed
by Allen and Rannells support this concept in that they
stated the TFCC (Tactical Flag Command Center) is supported by
information. They did not state that it was supported by
separate discrete streams of problems and solutions
.
Getting to the "root of the problem" demands that the
decision maker separate I (total information) into its
component parts. This is not a task which is frequently
performed for the decision maker. This classification and
separation process' is significantly influenced by the degree
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of ambiguity of the information (I™) that the decision maker
must work with, as well as the decision maker's tolerance for
ambiguous information. The process of converting ambiguous
information into meaningful information is an energy intensive
process, which detracts from energy being utilized more
effectively on choices. This process is also time consuming
and thus impacts upon the time available to study alternatives
should a deadline be involved. The decision maker's tolerance
for ambiguity should be viewed as one of the many factors
which produce idiosyncratic decision styles. Within the
military services ambiguity must be recognized as an influence
which accompanies information and increases the complexity of
that information load.
Ambiguity is a particularly powerful influence when
individuals view themselves as conventional decision makers,
and operate in an authoritarian organization setting such as
the Naval service. The ability to deal with ambiguity is
highly personality dependent and as such, systems design must
account for the role of the decision maker; not omit them as
CACI , Inc. did in Chapter II. Such as omission reflects
serious philosophical weaknesses, in that the concepts of
sorting, ambiguity and the myriad of other influences which
impace the decision process are minimized.
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VI. APPLICATION OF THE GARBAGE CAN TO A MILITARY ENVIRONMENT
One of the fundamental purposes of this thesis has been
to present the militarized version of the "Garbage Can". It
is an examination not only of the "Garbage Can" But also of
the way hierarchical structures are altered under several
information load conditions.
Before proceeding, a review is necessary. Up to this
point, the examination of present conditions has been
presented in an attempt to show the levels of sophistication
within a community which has the responsibility of modeling
decisions, decision processes, and the organizations which
support these decisions. This has been presented in an
attempt to allow the reader to recognize the complexities
and the nature of the task that was being attempted.
Further, an examination of philosophical model assumptions
was presented in the hope that the reader would recognize
a facet of the model selection process which is rarely
addressed. This has led to an explanation of the "Garbage
Can" and, in this author's opinion, it is a model which has
considerable relevance to a process that occurs in tactical
decision-making
.
The prior discussion on information was deemed
necessary, in that there are various interpretations of what
information really is, how it is used, and what types exist.
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By presenting the author's view of information and applying
these concepts to the "Garbage Can" model a more realistic
dipiction of the tactical process is facilitated.
To have completely accepted the "Garbage Can" as a
militarized version would have discounted many of the unique
problems that face Naval tactical decision makers. It is
this author's opinion that the manner that information flows
is one such distinguishing trait. Not to make this
modification would have required a degree of abstraction
that was felt to be an unfair representation of the com-
plexities of real time tactical decision making and an
sttempt to stretch the "Garbage Can" to a situation which
might not have been initially conceived. The "Garbage Can"
endorses as its unique environment university bureaucracies.
Naval tactical decision making is a demanding task which also
requires a thorough understanding of its unique environment
and the decision process with which it interfaces
.
The selection of a model which gives credit or recognizes
its environment is of the utmost importance. The "Garbage
Can" model was originally seen to describe the process and
the products thereof within the context of a university
bureaucracy. Although there are considerable similarities
between that process and the process of a large organization
such as the Navy there are also several key distinctions
which must be emphasized.
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One of the first and most fundamental considerations is
that Naval tactical decision making occurs primarily on board
ship. To fully understand this, the concept of a ship must
first be understood. A ship is far more than hardware and
people, it is an inseparable combination of the two. A
smooth running ship works as a composite entity reflecting
the leadership and individual personalities of that vessel.
Although a behavior which initially endorses a leadership
style or reflects the leadership style that is utilized on
that ship, it is more than that. Over time, a ship develops
a personality of its own, certainly a situation difficult
to describe unless someone (the reader) has been emotionally
involved as a member of such a vessel.
What is unique and important about this concept of a
ship as an entity with a personality is that it is essentially
a self-sustaining community. It is a container which requires
little from the outside in order to exist. This idea of a
ship as a container which "contains" several garbage cans
acting in a coordinated fashion has several parallels to the
idea that March and Olsen presented in their analogy of the
bureaucratic decision process as a succession of garbage cans.
Just as in the "Garbage Can", ships also receive problems,
solutions, energy and participants. Ships do not necessarily
receive these intput6 in the same manner. Shipboard inputs
are highly dependent upon telecommuncations and their
associated weaknesses (eg. fading, atmospheric conditions,

distance, equipment failure), while still being sensitive
23
to the same governing criteria. How these streams enter
is an important distinction, and hence the need to emphasize
this difference. Here, however, the participation which links
this isolated and self-sustaining community to its environment
may be terminated, or minimized, by either intentional or
overt action.
Previously, it was mentioned that the idea (metaphoric
symbol) of a garbage can was described as a container into
whick many discarded and dissimilar ideas were deposited.
The same holds true of the concept of a ship as a container
of several "Garbage Cans". Within the ship there are several
critical locations or spaces which need to be identified.
Two such places are the Combat Information Center (CIC), which
is a space designated to the examination and utilization of
tactical sensor and navigational information. All ships of
the line have such centers and are reserved primarily for
24their own use. Larger ships which embark Flag Officers
have such a space, as well as an additional one which is
designated for the sole use of embarked Flag Officers and
is known as Flag Plot.
23 Governing criteria--unclear technology, fluid
participation and ambiguity of relevance.
24 Officers of the rank of Commodore (0-7) or above
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Although the distinctions between a Combat Information
Center and Flag Plot are great, there are also many
similarities. For the purposes of this examination, this
author wishes to consider the similarities. Both are places
where decision makers are continually faced with tactical
choice opportunities. They are both points on board ship
where problems and solutions are funneled, acted upon, and
the results of choice situations are conveyed. This
notification of the decision made may be achieved internally
or transmitted to other vessels by flag hoist, flashing
light or radio broadcast.
Operating within a Combat Information Center or Flag
Tactical Plot is a unique experience and one which should be
required of all people who are involved in the decisions
which lead to the design of a tactical decision support
system.
Within these confined areas, many people operate in
cramped conditions to analyze tactical information gathered
from a multitude of sensors. Tactical decisions are made
based on these sensor inputs. These sensor inputs should
be considered as information since they have the potential
to carry value, meaning, and serve as a medium to transport
problems and solutions. The remaining examination of this
special case of the "Garbage Can" in this section will be
made with no organizational distinction between Flag
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Tactical Plot and CIC and, henceforth, will be referred to
as interchangeable entities unless specifically identified.
Within these shipboard spaces, numerous overhead radio
speakers broadcast information. At times, one speaker may be
providing the sole input. At other times, a condition may
exist where all speakers are simultaneously broadcasting.
This latter condition creates a very unique situation unlike
that faced by a corporate executive or university president
at a board meeting where he may control the rate at which he
receives his input be requesting that the individuals in
attendance speak one at a time. The commanding officer of
a ship, or a Flag Officer with control of numerous vessels,
may thus be forced to make important tactical decisions on
information that is received under less than ideal conditions.
The information load (1^) and the rate at which this decision
maker must assimilate information creates unique and demanding
restrictions on the choice process. Frequently, a response
is required almost instantaneously. These input streams must
be sorted to identify issues and identify problems and
solutions. Additionally, hypotheses must be generated,
options evaluated, and a choice (response) must result.
Decisions in combat often concern inflicting damage on others
or minimizing damage to one's own forces. Thus, the conse-
quences of these decisions are not only in terms of dollars,
but in terms of human life. In this case two very important
modifications to the originally conceived "Garbage Can" exist:
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1. The decisions are frequently irreversible in that if
the wrong decision is made, human life is unnecessarily lost.
2. The rate at which the information is presented to
the decision maker is frequently in a near real time environ-
ment and adequate study is frequently not possible.
According to Shapiro and Gilbert [Ref. M-0] individuals under
stress reduce information search, consider fewer alternatives,
overact to isolated pieces of information and generally
engage in what would/should be considered to be suboptimal
choice generation and selection. To reduce the behavior
mentioned by Shapiro and Gilbert requires the extensive use
of contingency planning and effective delegation of decision
authority.
When examined from another viewpoint, the problems and
solutions that enter into this choice opportunity are
typically injected from the external environment which
surrounds not just the Combat Information Center but the
entire ship. In regard to a Flag Tactical Plot which is
responsible for decisions not of just one ship but on
numerous vessels, then the input to this decision arena
should be viewed as entering from the external environment
that surrounds the Naval organization for which the Flag
Tactical Plot has responsibility.
In order to make timely decisions in a combat environment,
the tactical decision maker must integrate information from
numerous sources very effectively. This must be done with
85

great rapidity and requires that the decision maker be able
to analyze a problem quickly by identifying the key issues
in a real time environment.
This requires a sorting process. A process in which the
decision maker sorts through the information as it is
presented to him and he must be able to recognize from that
information what the problem is, as well as generate correc-
tive action. When time is of the essence, frequently, this
process is far more difficult that it may outwardly seem.
It requires a clear understanding of objectives which
frequently are not adequately presented to the tactical
decision maker. Initial objectives are frequently altered
during the course of a military engagement and are not
modified as the engagement proceeds. Yet, this tactical
decision maker is required to get to the crux of the problem
in a nearly instantaneous fashion and frequently must rely
on the advice of staff members who are also confronted with
similar situations in their specific specialty areas.
Nonetheless, the need to delegate alters decision and access
structures, as well as reducing the traditional importance
of the individual delegating while empowering the less
important individual who is the recipient of the delegation.
There are numerous subtle distinctions between the military




the military case are technology driven (i.e., are
frequently dependent upon the reliability of transmission
to even to be able to delegate, and be kept informed).
The Naval (military) scenario should be distinguished
from the pure "Garbage Can", although it is essentially
endorsing many of the same concepts, due to the importance
of time in the tactical scenario. Many of these differences
between the university and military cases are simply a matter
of relative importances (areas of emphasis).
In the "Garbage Can", Cohen, March, and Olsen speak of
load as a measure of complexity and view decision structures
and access structures as static entities in their simulation.
This load is a measure of the complexity of the decision at
hand. A fundamental and very important distinction between
the Naval application and the university conception is that
load in the Naval case refers to information load . It is
this author's contention that increased information load
increases the complexity of the decision since a decision
is made more difficult with more information. The
integrative process is strained, and the demands on the
25 Technology in this sense referes to scientific and
industrial advancements , as opposed to the term unclear
technology used in Chapter V to indicate the uncertainty





sorting process are accentuated that much more. The sorting
and selective utilization of information is dependent upon
trigger mechanisms in addition to the concept of cognitive
? fi
perception. This was presented as an influence which this
author feels cannot be discounted because it is an initial
condition which affects the manner in which decision makers
integrate and process information. Interestingly enough,
there is a possible relationship between this concept and
the "Garbage Can". Cohen, March, and Olsen utilize the term
energy which this author has defined as a function of
participation. Nonetheless, energy in the "Garbage Can" can
be thought of not only as a prerequisite to action, but also
as a mechanism which sorts—determines which opportunities
have the necessary energy. If the reader desires, both
energy and cognitive perceptions may be considered as
processes which aid in developing alternatives, and which
frequently result in a "satisfying" condition.
If one looks at information load as a measure of com-
plexity in decision making, then an important distinction
has been made. Adoption of these points of view recognizes
the possibility of incurring ambiguity, increased risk,
relevance determinations, increased sort time, and time
9 fi
For additional information on triggers in Garbage
Can tactical applications, consult "Toward a Theory of




restrictions. Not only does an increasing load situation
increase the complexity of the decision process, it also
increases the complexity of the organizational structure
which is tasked with handling this increasing load. With
an increasing load condition, the interaction among the
organizational members who are aiding the decision maker
in sanitizing information is significant and creates
additional communicative skill requirements. Not only must
the information which is being injected into this organiza-
tion be digested, but the information flow between actors
must also be coordinated. This requires new energy demands
and new participative requirements. It is the author's
view that the concept of teamwork is stressed here far more
than in any civilian situation. Key actors in this type of
organization must not only be able to communicate with
external sources, in a real time environment, but also
among themselves.
Additionally, with the CIC or Flag Tactical Plot
scenario, there are some unique qualities that are
associated with voice telecommunications and are not present
in most civilian or university board rooms, and that is the
concept of gain. In this context, the term "gain" is used
so as to be distinguished from the word volume. Henceforth,
volume will be referred to as a measure of quantity,
whereas gain will be used as an indicator of the loudness
with which verbal information is received. A point that
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this author was not able to find discussed in any research
reports concerning Tactical Decision Support System design
was the concept of gain. It is this author's view that gain
should be viewed as a biasing mechanism, which alters
cognitive boundaries by altering the emphasis placed on
specific kinds of information.
Consider the following scenario: you are operating in a
Flag Tactical Plot on board an aircraft carrier and within
this confined space various circuits are broadcasting via
overhead loud speakers. Additionally, information is being
received by various operators via various sensor consoles.
Imagine the confusion that exists when seven to ten
speakers are simultaneously broadcasting. It is felt that
consideration of the location of those speakers relative to
the location of the key decision maker is of the utmost
importance and the gain of those speakers is of equal
importance. The speaker closest to the decision maker will
be more easily heard than the speaker which is the farthest
corner, assuming that both are being broadcast at equal gain,
If in this integrated process, the decision maker fails to
hear information which is critical to the choice process,
then essentially his perception about the situation has been
altered. Consider also that all speakers are broadcasting
at equal gain and the decision maker has acclimated himself
to that environment and then, unknowingly, someone increases
the gain to a particular speaker; the information being
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received via that speaker must certainly impact the view of
the decision maker in that it is more readily heard. This
not only biases the environment by giving greater prominence
to the loudest speaker, it diminishes the value of the
other transmissions of reduced gain. It is the biasing of
the external environment under these circumstances that may
attract the attention of the decision maker, as well as
altering the temporal proximity that problems and solutions
which are enfused to this choice opportunity.
This concept of varying gain for broadcast information
has considerable importance in the way problems and solutions
align themselves. If a solution is not heard (not permitted
to enter the choice) and a problem exists, then a choice
may be made which improperly assigns the problem to another
solution yielding an "oversight" condition. Another
possibility exists under such circumstances— "flight"
.
This suggests, even if only by association, that the
timing of input at least the timing as far as when the
decision maker receives inputs, as opposed to when they are
actually received within the organization, may affect the
allocation of energy and have the potential to affect the
outcome of that choice opportunity. If one recalls the quote
which referenced Dr. March, and stated that the manner in
which problems and solutions align themselves is related to
their temporal proximities. It is this author's contention
that the concept of gain should be viewed as a biasing
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mechanism. This is a condition which must be addressed and
accounted for when one examines the concept of information
load. The absence of gain, or a silenced speaker due to
equipment malfunction, illustrates an extreme case scenario--
yet this is frequently a realistic occurrence in combat and
should also be viewed as a biasing influence.
For a further examination on the value of communications
between sources in regard to broken communications, consult
the bibliography and the unpublished paper by Dr. Roger
Weissinger-Baylon which discussed Naval communications and
loose couplings.
Not only should the absence of a critical source of
information such as an overhead broadcast speaker be
considered from the standpoint of gain, but also as partial
degradation of the system to present problems and solutions.
It should be viewed as a mechanism which severs energy
(prevents participants fron contributing). If energy is,
in fact, a function of participation, then you must
consider the possibility that a Flag Officer in a Flag
Tactical Plot may be obligated to call upon a circuit and
request to speak to the commanding officer on another vessel
This enables that Flag Officer confronted with a tactical
decision to access information from somebody who may be more
familiar with the circumstances in a specific area. For
example, a Flag Officer may be confronted with making a
decision on whether he should reallocate his resources
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and send several ships to the South, knowing full well that
such a decision will fragment his force structure. In
order to make such a decision, he may desire to speak to the
commanding officer on a vessel South of him, for an assessment
of the situation in that region. If communications are
severed due to equipment malfunction, or jamming on the part
of the enemy, then he cannot solicit that opinion. This
essentially is the same as stating that the commanding
officer himself is unable to participate and thus is unable
to contribute the energy which has already been expended, on
his part, in examining the environment with which he is most
familiar. Essentially severed communications is an altera-
tion of the access matrix. It is for this reason that this
author in the previous chapter defined energy as a function
of participation. Further, this author feels that the
delegation of portions of a choice is essentially a method
of reallocating energy to mini choices (portions of a larger
choice) in a manner that matches available energy to a choice
(mini choice). This enhances the possibility that outcomes
of mini choices will be resolved. However, choices must then
be conveyed to higher authority if that mini choice outcome
is to serve as a component of a more global choice opportunity
In delegating authority, the important decision maker holds
in reserve his energy for use on important choices. However,
if delegated choice opportunity outcomes cannot, or are not,
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transmitted back to the delegator, then energy is not
conserved and the summation of participatory energy cannot
be applied to a global choice.
This also serves as an example of why a distinction was
made between relevant and nonrelevant information. If this
Flag Officer made the decision, the circuit began to broad-
cast and it was discovered that resources were not needed
(i.e., to the South) and yet had been sent, then the infor-
mation is not relevant to the extent that the decision has
already been made. This is not to say that a new choice
situation is not presently available in which a previous
decision may be reversed, but rather the information which
was required at t, was not available until t
?
.
Granted the volume of information as well as the gain of
the information which is received are important factors in
determining the manner in which problems and solutions
inject themselves into the decision point (eg., a ship or a
Combat Information Center) . The quality of the transmission
received must also be considered. If information received
is garbled, or is hampered with excessive static, then a
degree of ambiguity is introduced into the information that
is being received. For example, suppose that a transmission
is received over a particular speaker indicating a particular
problem, but the entire situation is not presented to the
decision maker as a result of a momentary break or a weak
transmission. This is in keeping with the findings of
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Mintzberg [Ref. 4-1] where he states that information streams
presented to the decision maker are predominately ambiguous
verbal constructs. The result is that the full implications
of the problem being presented are not clearly understood,
resulting in the introduction of ambiguity, uncertainty,
as well as risk and/or the perception of risk. The intro-
duction of risk occurs when a wrong decision might result
because of the fact that the situation is not clearly
understood
.
Not only should participation be considered in the
previous context in that participation is possible via
electronic communication, but participation should also be
viewed from the standpoint of the geographic location of
vessels. For example, consider a task force organization
where of a discrete number of vessels are steaming in a
formation in support of one another. As the course of
events proceed, various vessels (assets) are dispatched--
this should be viewed as a decrease in the potential to
participate. If a particular vessel is unable to partici-
pate, resolution may not be possible. For example, should
a vessel which has a unique offensive capability be required
in a choice situation, and yet, is geographically unavailable
to participate, then certainly its ability to provide a
possible solution to an immediate threat is diminished.
A condition which is not present in a boardroom or
university environment and is very real condition in the
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military is a condition known as EMCON. EMCON is the acronym
which stands for Emissions Control. If EMCON is set, then
the use of radio frequencies or electromagnetic radiation
(radar, sonar) devices is reduced or prohibited. This is
done so as to deprive the enemy of the ability to monitor
those types of transmissions via their sensors. Under EMCON,
geographical location (visual proximity) gains considerable
importance since the ability to communicate is dependent on
visual means such as flag hoist or flashing light. If a
vessel has been detached and is required to provide input,
i.e., to participate and thus provide energy to a choice
situation while EMCON is in existence, then participation and
energy are once again degraded (if outside visual signaling
range). These are all factors which affect the relevance,
the ambiguity, and the riskiness of the decision maker's
information as well as the perception of his choice
opportunity. There are also conditions which certainly make
the military decision process a very complex one.
The manner in which human beings adjust to various
information load conditions is of paramount significance.
In the Cohen, March, and Olsen "Garbage Can" model and its
accompanying simulation, three load conditions are examined:
low, medium, and high.
In their model, these are considered as measures of
complexity and are expressed as constants. This considers
choices of equal complexity, and not complexity introduced
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by information load. For the purposes of this thesis they
are viewed as measures of information load in a steady state
condition.
Rarely is the information load constant. At one moment,
the decision maker may be faced with making a crucial decision
on inadequate information, and the next moment be overburdened
with information. The ability to transition between those
two conditions and adjust one's decision style is certainly
paramount in the tactical environment. This need to be
flexible lends credence to the concept that decision
structures and access structures should be viewed as dynamic
entities rather than as static ones. In the next chapter, the
results of several runs on the Cohen, March, and Olsen




VII. THE GARBAGE CAN SIMULATION
Before commencing an analysis of the data generated by
the "Garbage Can" simulation, it is first helpful to
describe the contents of the following appendices which
contain the simulation and its accompanying results. The
order of appendicies is by increasing load.
Appendix A: The content of this appendix include the
simulation which served as the constant information load
bench mark. This consists of the base program and output
for the first three runs. First run was executed with a low
constant load condition (1.1), the second run with a medium
constant condition (2.2), and the third run with a high
constant load condition (3.3). All three runs assume a
constant load for twenty time intervals/periods (of an
unspecified duration). It may be helpful, however, to view
each time period as being one minute.
Appendix B: Includes modification one, Mod 1, of the
"Garbage Can" simulation. Here an increasing load condition
exists from time period zero through time period five (1.1,
1.5, 2.0, 2.6, 3.6), a decreasing load condition from time
period five through time period nine (2.6, 2.0, 1.5, 1.1),
and a constant low load condition (1.1) from time period
nine through time period twenty.
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Appendix C: Consists of modification two, or Mod 2, of
the "Garbage Can" simulation. Here, an increasing load
condition is simulated for the first ten time periods
(1.1, 1.2, 1.1+ , 1.6, 1.8, 2.1, 2.4, 2.7, 3.1, 3.6) and then,
from time periods ten through twenty, a constant high load
condition exists (3.6).
The reader, before proceeding, may desire to examine the
three previous mentioned appendices. Before doing so, it is
necessary to recognize that only one access and decision
structure are examined in following commentary and hence only
printout supporting these structures are included in these
three appendices. Specifically the hierarchical decision
structure and hierarchial access structure are only included,
in that the author recognized a need to limit the analysis.
The motive and/or assumption which supports this limitation
is that these two structures best reflect the organizational
structures utilized in military organizations.
A. COMPUTERIZED SIMULATION SUMMARY DATA ANALYSIS
The folloiwng commentary based on data summaries
generated by the simulation, which may also be observed in
Appendices A, B, and C. It is an analysis of summary statis-
tics which are also displayed in the following table (Table
7.1) entitled Data Summary Statistics. This table consists
of ten categories down the lefthand column versus the five
computer simulation runs ( low[Appendix A], medium [Appendix
A], high [Appendix A], Mod 1 [Appendix B], Mod 2 [Appendix C])
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The ten categories are described as follows:
Category 1 is a count of the number of choices which were
activated yet were not made. This is an analysis of the
number of choice failures that existed in the last time
period.
Category 2 is a count of choices which were activated and
not made for the entire simulation.
Category 3 measures decision maker activity. It is a
count of decision makers moving from choice to choice.
Category 4 indicates the number of problems not resolved
by period twenty.
Category 5 is a measure of problem activity— a count of
how often problems moved from choice to choice.
Category 6 is the number of problems that entered yet did
not attach to a choice. That is, problems which entered
into the choice and were not examined--no participant
examined them.
Category 7 is the measure (count) of the number of times
a problem is activated and attached yet is not solved.
Category 8 is the number of times a decision maker is not
attached to a choice, therefore the decision maker is not
used for any choice.
Category 9 is the measure of energy reserve, that is energy
that was not utilized by participants during the simulation
Category 10 is a measure of energy wasteage. Here, a
measure is presented indicating that more energy was
utilized than was necessary, to obtain the results from
the choices which were made. This should be interpreted
as the measure of wasted participation, a measure of
excess participation.
The summary statistics suggest several interesting
relationships. The first being that choice failures in the
last period (Category 1) occurred under both high constant














Moci 2 Mod 1
1 1 1
2 12 39 51 40 27
3 51 62 61 63 63
4 2 2 16 17 2
5 M-7 64 68 51 52
6 27 26 16 27
7 57 165 266 235 108
8 99 32 20 21 70
9 38. 27 18. 83 11. 40 12. 53 31.61
10 7. 93 7. 57 18. 72 13. 09 8.19
The second point of interest is that during the high and
Mod 2 runs , the number of choices activated but not made is
considerably higher count than for the other three runs. This
measure (Category 2) can possibly be viewed as a measure of
indecision. If this is a valid assumption, then one may
conclude that under conditions of high load, or Mod 2', the
decision maker has a difficult time determining which choice
101

is in fact relevant to the environment. This results in a
considerable number of choices being considered (activated)
but not being made.
When examining the third category, there seems to be a
trend towards greater decision maker movement (activity) with
increasing load; that is, movement from choice to choice as
load increases. The value for medium constant load is 6 2
and the value for constant high load is 61. This incongruity
weakens such an argument, however, if examined on the spectrum
from low load with a count of 51, to a high load, with a
decision making activity value of 63, then a spectrum or
range has been established indicating that choice activity
over that range does increase. However, to substantiate
this trend additional data points are needed.
Category 4- which is a count of the number of problems not
solved by the last period shows that the high constant load
and Mod 2 runs had the highest number of problem-failures.
These two runs had approximately eight times the number of
problem failures as the other three runs. If applied to a
"real world" scenario, this could be interpreted as the
difficulty of a decision maker to allocate their talents to
making choices early in a choice opportunity, rather than
expending them on adjusting to the environmental constraints
imposed upon them. The other three runs each had two
problem-failures during the last period. Of the three runs,
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two had constant loads (low and medium), and the remaining
had a load within that range for the majority of the run.
Although the load had momentarily increased in Mod 1, it
also decreased in that run and thus allowed adequate time to
recover from the temporary increase in load.
In examining Category 5, no clear trend appears in
regard to problem activity.
In regard to Category 6 which is a measure (count) of
the number of problems which are not looked at, it is
interesting to note that more problems were not looked at
under the low, medium, and Mod 1 runs. It is the author's
view that there is an inconsistency here in that the run
under high constant load indicates zero problems which were
not examined. This seems to be an unusual condition. One
possible explanation is that all problems were looked at due
to the scores received in Categories 2 and 3 (high activity)
,
but this preoccupation restricted the ability to apply
energy to resolution.
Category 7 when examined indicates that the number of
time periods a problem was activated and attached and not
solved. The two highest conditions here appeared under the
high constant load and Mod 2 runs. When these figures in
Category 7 are compared to Category 9 which is energy
reserve, it is interesting to note that the runs with the
highest number of problems which were activated/attached
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but not solved are also the runs which had the lowest
values of reserve energy, indicating a possible misallocation
of energy and/or participation.
In examining Category 8, which is the number of times the
decision maker is not attached to a choice, the two highest
vlaues are for low constant load and Mod 1. This is not
surprising, in that Mod 1 returned to a low constant load
for time period nine through twenty. Further, the two runs
having the highest values in Category 8 are also the two runs
which have the highest energy reserve in Category 9. The
two runs which had the highest wasted energy were high load
and Mod 2. It is also these runs which had the highest
number of time periods where problems were activated and
attached but were not solved. This might suggest that energy
was wasted due to the misallocation of the participants, or
to the fact that the high degree of indecision of choice
activities which was noted in Category 2 resulted in the
energy being utilized for transitting between choices, and
not on resolving choices.
B. COMPUTERIZED SIMULATION CHOICE OUTCOME ANALYSIS
The following data (Table 7.2) was developed by analyzing
the choice activation matrix and the problem history matrix
in Appendices A, B, and C. Here, the author determined in
what periods "resolution", "flight", or "oversight" occurred
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when these three conditions occurred and the information
load at that instant (time period) that these outcomes
occurred. A considerable number of resolutions occurred in
the first time period for the low, medium, Mod 1 and Mod 2
runs. This indicates that resolution was possible when
information load conditions were between 1.1 and 1.2. Mod 1,
Mod 2, and low load runs all commenced at a 1.1 load level,
while the medium load commenced in time period one with a
load factor of 2.2. In the case of high constant load--it
commended in time period one with a value of 3.3. The load
(information load) in the high run may be viewed as being
too extreme (no adjustment period) to result in anything but
"oversight" and "flight" until time period ten, which at
this time four resolutions occurred. The high constant load
which only had four resolutions and which occurred at time
period ten may indicate a possible "real world" situation
where considerable adaptation by decision makers is required
to adjust to the complexity (information burdens) of their
environment prior to making appropriate choices. Once this
adjustment had been made, however, resolution was possible.
The remaining ten time periods provided only "flight" in
time periods thirteen and twenty, possibly indicating that
inadequate energy exists, after adjustment and the initial
resolution, which could be applied to choice opportunities
in significant quantity to yield anything except "flight".
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In run Mod 1, other than the initial resolutions to
problems eight and twenty in period one, nothing else other
than "oversight" occurred until period nine, which at this
time seven resolutions occurred prior to the load leveling
out to a low constant value (1.1). In this particular run,
it was not until period seventeen that additional resolution
was possible, and seven resolution conditions again occurred.
Consult Table 7.2 to examine this trend.
The previously mentioned concepts of ambiguity, risk and
uncertainty apply to "oversight" and "flight" outcomes. The
"oversight" condition can be associated with reduced search,
or poor decisions due to ambiguous information. "Flight"
may be related to "real world" avoidance behavior due to
high (unacceptable) risk. Both are suboptimal outcomes which
appear in the simulation with greater frequency in high
information load runs. The occurrance of both "flight" and
"oversight" under high I™ compare in a manner which parallels
similar "real world" conditions. Thus, it can be stated
that this simulation is a reasonable representation of
suboptimal choice outcomes under high information load.
Although not performed in this simulation, additional
research needs to be pursued in regard to access and decision
which change dynamically as information load is altered.
For run Mod 2 , "resolution" occurred in periods one and
two as the load increased. At time period four an
""oversight" occurred and then in periods eight, nine, ten,
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and eleven, one "oversight" and three "flight" conditions
resulted (respectively) prior to the load leveling off to a
constant high load condition. This high load condition
did not enable a higher degree of success according to this
simulation. This run yielded an additional "flight" outcome
in period twenty. When the number of "resolutions" are
examined for the five runs, the low and medium (constant
loads) and Mod 1 (a close second) yielded the highese number
of resolutions with eighteen and sixteen (respectively).
The lowest number of "oversights" occurred with medium
constant load. The lowest occurrence of "flight" occurred
in the los constant load and Mod 1 runs. The highest number
of "oversight" conditions existed in high constant load and
in Mod 2, both yielding five "oversights".
It is significant to note that problems entered the
simulation two at a time or during the first ten time
periods. By the end of the tenth time period all problems
had entered, and no new problems entered the simulation in
time periods eleven through twenty. However, this did not
mean these problems were not free to still be acted upon
after period ten. This does, however, partially account for
why the majority of "resolutions" occurred prior to time
period ten. Time periods fifteen through nineteen were
essentially void of any fruitful activity with the exception
of the seven resolutions which occurred in the low run in
period seventeen, the eleven resolutions in period twenty,
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and the seven resolutions in period seventeen for the medium
load run. It should be noted that periods of reduced activity
or nonactivity seem to follow periods of activity. At least
to the extent that "resolution" occurs in clusters and is
then followed by period yielding only "flight" or "oversight"
until "resolution" once again results. This behavior suggests
a "real world" condition previously stated which eluded to a
decision maker's behavior under conditions of continued
success. Further examination is certainly needed in this
area. The previous comment is simply an attempt to validate
simulation results. As is hopefully recognized, simulation
results are only as good as the simulation itself. This
simulation like all simulations has weaknesses/limitations
and possibly the most significant point here is to see
whether the simulation, with the restrictive bounds placed
upon it, endorses the decision maker's behavior and his/her
reactions to information load.
Another underlying assumption in this simulation is that
the most important decision makers become the least important
decision makers as time progresses. This is an attempt to
show that with time these people must relinquish traditional
roles and traditional power and thus weaken their normal




A considerable number of "flight" conditions exist from
periods ten through period fourteen, suggesting that a large
number of decisions fleeing from problems
—
problems which
entered in periods one through ten. Prior to period ten,
the majority of decisions resulted in either "resolution"
or "oversight". This is an interesting pattern, in that,
prior to all problems being injected into the choice,
"oversight" occurred with greater frequency than "flight"
suggesting a "real world" pressure to make a premature
decision. After all problems were entered, the tendency
was to make choices resulting in "flight". An additional
observation which may be made is that the majority of
activity occurred in the first ten time periods, as problems
entered the choice opportunity. Of significant, also, is
that the seven "resolution" conditions which occurred in
Mod 1 (time period nine) occurred at a time when the load
factor had once again reached 1.1. For Mod 1 seven
resolutions also occurred at the load factor of 1.1 in time
period seventeen. This suggests that the majority of
resolutions which occurred, occurred in the low, medium, and
Mod 1 runs and suggested that a load that was predominently
within the range of 1.1 and 2.2 yielded the highest number of
resolutions. This closely coincides with the previous
commentary mentioned by Siegfried Streufert and associates
in which it was stated that an intermediate load (information
load) yielded the optimal environment for the decision maker.
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This simulation data supports that contention and is one of
the few consistent themes that can be derived from the
results generated here. It is also interesting to compare
the number of "resolutions" which were achieved in low and
medium runs, and then compare that number to the Category 10
results of the previous table (Table 7.1). The significance
point here is that the two runs which had the highest number
of "resolutions" also had the lowest amount of energy wasted.
The significant point when referring to indecision and its
possible relationship to the sorting process is that of Category
2 data. This category has a range of values from 12 to 51 with
the two lowest values being 12 and 27, and they are associated
to the low load and Mod 1 runs. In the case of low constant
load, the load factor remained 1.1 for the entire twenty time
periods. In regard to Mod 1, the load was 1.1 from time
period nine to time period twenty. The benefits of low load
suggest that lower levels of indecision occur in lower load
conditions. It is also interesting to examine Category 2,
which addressed choices activated not made, in regard to the
number of resolutions which occurred in the high load and
Mod 2 runs, having only four and three "resolutions"
respectively.
When examining the data for Category 8 , a count on decision
makers which were not used, the highest count occurred for the
high load condition. The next highest count for Category 8
occurred for Mod 2 which had ten time periods at a load factor
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of 3.6 over ten periods. The point to be made here is that
those runs with a high load, or at least a high load for the
predominance of the run, had the lowest energy reserve
values, and highest energy wasteage , while also having the
highest count in Category 2 and Category 7.
The significance of these results suggests that informa-
tion load is related to the allocation of energy, (related
to the degree of participation) which has a significant
impact on the number of resolutions. This suggests that
participation levels are critical factors within the
organizational structure and hence organizations must be
capable of accommodating the demands placed upon them. To
solely rely on this data as an absolute indicator of any
particular trend is inappropriate—additional data points
need to be collected. However, it is noteworthy that there
are in fact significant variations in the data with various
load conditions.
It is also necessary to recall that problems enter the
simulation in the first ten time periods. Altering the
manner in which these problems enter could seriously
impact the statistics which have been developed.
Thus, it is this author's opinion that they are several
areas that must be examined further if the simulation is to
be fully understood. Those areas being the point of entry
and rate at which streams enter the choice.
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If nothing else, the simulation data indicates that the
number of "resolutions" achieved is a function of the load
factor. Those computer runs which had low load factors had
the highest degree of resolution, while those computer runs





This thesis has provided a "web" analysis of a condition
known as information load. It has examined the school of
thought which is responsible for creating devices which
produce and/or utilize information; it has examined several
systems and the modeling assumptions which accompany them;
it has examined weaknesses in these philosophical assumptions.
Moreover, it has related information (I-,) and its components
to the tactical environment. This is not the only environ-
ment that information must interface with effectively, and
as such the human environment was addressed in regard to risk,
ambiguity and the role of individual perceptions.
Offered in postulatum was the "Garbage Can" model of
Cohen, March, and Olsen; which as a theoretical model of
organizational decision making provided a means (via verbal
discussion and simulation) to examine less than optimal
choice outcomes ("flight", "oversight") under various
information load conditions
.
Additonally, a modification of the "Garbage Can" was
presented. This modification consisted of several subtle
distinctions
:
1. It protrayed inputs as streams which were largely
telecommunication dependent.
2. Recognized problems and solutions not as separate





3. Presented participation as a subset of energy and
thereby permitting the regulation of participation and
energy by altering the availability and/or quality of
telecommunication transmissions.
Despite these modifications the underlying theme of both the
"Garbage Can" model and its associated simulation apply.
The simulation was executed for five runs. Here, however,
the load factor was depicted as a measure of information
load. Under either name the choice process reflected the
imposed increase in complexity as load/ information load
variables were increased. The information load when high
(3.3 or above) impeded the choice process by requiring that
energy be expended on peripheral activities , and hence
depleting the finite amount of energy allotted to a choice.
This expenditure of energy created an energy reserve which
was below the threshold which was necessary for resolution,
and as a result "flight" and "oversight" dominated the runs
where high information load was imposed.
As with all simulations, the goal is to replicate a
condition or event. It is this author's view that this does
an acceptable job of representing a portion of the "real
world". This is not to say that it does not have limitations.
The data generated by this simulation does however suggest
several important concepts. These are as follows:
1. Different information loads effect choice outcomes.
2. High information load reduces the number of "resolutions"
produced by decision makers.
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3. "Flight" occurs in greater frequency when inadequate
energy exists to obtain "resolution".
4. High information load conditions consume large quantities
of energy.
5. Considerable amounts of energy are wasted under high
information load conditions, suggesting that it is utilized
on other activities than making choices.
This author feels that the above five points are an
accurate reflection of the tactical decision making environ-
ment and offers the following view: That system designers in
3both the C I and TDSS communities recognize that the primary
concern is no longer simply supplying information. Rather,
recognize that human processes are reaching their information
processing limit, and a need exists which merits redirecting
their design efforts (changing their philosophical assumptions)
3This change should recognize that if C I/TDSS is an extension
of human processes [Ref. M-2], then critical human factors which
limit this extension must be considered. Finally, the emphasis
must be on providing properly sanitized (filtered) and accurate
information within the low to medium information load range if
"resolution" is to be expected. The technology is present,
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